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Abstract: A rise in corruption and in the exposure of corruption in recent 
decades is observable in contemporary democracies, especially on the European 
continent. Anti-corruption campaigns on the part of magistrates and others have 
increased  in  the  past  two  decades,  and  as  a  consequence  revelations  about 
corruption have become more widespread. This has not just been at national level, 
but at the supranational and international levels, e.g. the EU. This article exposes 
this phenomenon in democratic countries and examines the possible remedies and 
solution adapted to highly develop societies.
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One cannot easily study a phenomenon, which, by its nature, is 
clandestine. One is therefore dependent upon assessing the newness, scale 
and  varieties  of  corruption  either  from  different  case  studies  or  from 
perceptions.
Most  studies  on  corruption suggest  that political corruption in 
contemporary democracies has increased in the past two decades to the 
point that one can speak of it as a new issue. Many of the world experts on 
corruption  are  explicit  on  this  point. The  1990s  were  marked  by  the 
exposure of a considerable number of high-profile corrupt practices in 
Italy, Germany, Britain, Belgium, France, Spain and Greece. In Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), despite the unreliability of official statistics and 
media reports, the sheer number of cases and convictions suggest that 
corruption has increased (Thompson, 2000; Levi, Michael, and David 
Nelkin, 1996). The EU saw the resignation of the entire Commission after 
allegations of corruption leveled at particular commissioners, and there has 
been a big rise in international corruption. Some European authors on 
corruption are more cautions. They argue that it is impossible to tell 
whether or not there has been a rise in corruption in their countries, or 
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interest and exposure, with a concomitant decline in levels of public trust 
(Ireland, the Netherlands, Japan, Sweden, US, Portugal) (Sampford, 2006; 
Jamieson, 1996). Nevertheless, in this paper I argue that, as an issue, 
political corruption in contemporary democracies has become much more 
prominent in the past two decades. In the second part, we look at remedies 
and solutions that are available to decision-makers.
Scale
If political corruption is a relatively new issue, establishing the 
exact  scale  of  the  phenomenon  is  much  more  complex,  especially 
comparatively.  The  comparative  scale  of  corruption  produced  by 
Transparency  International's  Index,  for  example,  can  be  relied  on  for 
consistency only with considerable difficulty (Transparency International 
reports, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). In addition to the factor 
already mentioned, perceptions may be influenced by scandals generated 
by the exposure of corruption – but the degree of scandals is determined by 
various factors, including expectations amongst the national public. There 
is also problem of the impact of the level at which corruption occurs on the 
overall perceived scale of corruption. Put bluntly, the bigger the names 
exposed the more likely it is that the perceived scale of corruption in the 
country will be higher (Germany, where there is little routine sub- national 
corruption but big names at the top have been exposed, might be cited as an 
example here) (Sampford, 2006: 57). What is clear about the scale of 
corruption is that it can, on the one hand, become all encompassing, 
stretching from the periphery to the centre and involving a large number of 
politicians,  bureaucrats,  entrepreneurs  and  others.  In  other  words,  it 
becomes pervasive at both the lower and higher levels (Italy, CEE). On the 
other  hand,  it  might  involve  politicians  mainly  at  the  highest  level 
(Germany, Japan) or mainly at the lower levels. The latter is most likely to 
be the case where one party has been dominant for long periods of time (US, 
Sweden, Portugal).
Varieties
The  types  of  political  corruption  are  rich  and  diverse  (Rose-
Ackerman, 1999: 32; Bac, 1998). The main varieties concern corruption 
arising from:
--  The  power  of  politicians  to  take  decisions  concerning  the 
allocation of public money or to take other commercially charged decisions 
(a  tendency  reinforced  where  the  decision-making  criteria  are 
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role in making decisions with a direct impact on certain business or other 
interests (Ireland, Japan, US, Sweden, Portugal, Greece). Otherwise, it may 
take place through the use of kickbacks and other illegal devices for the 
award of public contracts, the proceeds of which can be channeled into 
party  coffers  or  individuals'  pockets  (Italy,  Ireland,  Germany,  Japan, 
Belgium) (Della Porta and Alberto, 1999);
-- The exercise of discretion by civil servants over commercial 
decisions, especially in a context of lax systems of accountability and 
ambiguous policy objectives (Ireland, Greece);
-- The violation of party finance laws, by undisclosed and therefore 
illegal  donations,  usually  to  influence  policies.  Beneficiaries  can  be 
individuals, parties and election campaigns (Italy, Germany, Japan, Britain, 
Belgium, France, US, Portugal, CEE, Spain, Greece);
-- The power to supply public services, permits and resources (Italy, 
Greece);
-- The power of public officials to investigate private conduct and 
impose penalties (e.g. tax inspectors in Italy and Greece; the police in 
Britain);
-- The power of elected representatives to influence legislation in 
favor of selected groups or individuals in return for financial or other gain 
(Italy, Ireland, Japan, Britain, US, CEE) (Johnson, Roberta Anne, 2004: 
123-132);
-- The power to bestow patronage or honors and to determine the 
post-retirement employment of public officials (Japan, Britain);
-- The power to influence the allocation of EU grants, structural 
funds and subsidies (Italy, Portugal, Greece);
-- The implementation of customs and immigration controls at 
national borders (CEE, Greece).
Causes of Corruption
The  cases  of  corruption  are  multifarious  and  it  is,  of  course, 
important  to  distinguish  between  factors  that  facilitate  the  growth  of 
corruption (that is historical, structural and cultural factors) from those that 
are more direct causes. The development of corruption is dependent not just 
on the presence of certain structural/historical variables but also on the 
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detection. However, some factors fall into both categories.
Political Culture
The development of corrupt practices is more likely where cultural 
attitudes are not strongly supportive of a country's democratic institutions 
(Italy, Belgium, Portugal, Greece) or democracy more generally. In the 
German case, for example, it is argued that the public does not value 
democracy for its own sake because it did not acquire democracy by itself. 
The latter point is especially pertinent in countries with an authoritarian or 
dictatorial historical legacy, and of note is that in CEE those countries 
which are considered to be the most corrupt are those which are currently 
least  democratic  in  their  institutional  arrangements  (Husted,  1999; 
Johnston, Michael, 2005; Kidd, and Frank-Jürgen, 2003).
Corrupt practices are also more likely to develop where societal 
culture is particularistic, where the prevailing view is that law and its 
enforcement is ultimately negotiable, and where 'pork barrel' politics is 
common (Italy, Ireland, Japan, Belgium, Portugal, Spain, Greece, US). In 
these countries there may be insufficient public pressures on politicians to 
act responsibly.
Yet, even in countries which do not belong in this category, attitudes 
to culture is (that is, the norms and values of politicians and civil servants) 
becoming an issue (Britain, the Netherlands, Germany). In some countries 
cultural attitudes toward the moral probity of public servants may give rise 
to complacency and the assumption that such officials can be trusted 
(Britain), or else to the view that corrupt practices can be justifies if they 
help to oil the cogs of an inefficient state machine (France) (Husted, 1999).
In addition, a society characterized by the presence of patron-client 
relationships and where personal connections are important can facilitate 
the development of corrupt exchanges (Italy, Ireland, Japan, Belgium, 
France, Portugal, Greece, Spain). Strong traditions of freemasonry and 
secrecy (Italy, Portugal), the presence of organized crime (Italy, Ireland, 
Japan),  and  countries  where  there  is  an  absence  of  clear  criteria  or 
transparency relating to public appointments (Portugal, Spain) are often 
symptomatic of the presence of clientelistic practices (Kurer Oskar, 1993).
Political Structures and Institutions
The political factors outlined above are more likely to have an 
impact in the context of highly centralized political system, a long-standing 
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insufficiently  modernized  (Italy,  Ireland,  Japan,  Belgium,  France, 
Portugal, Greece) (Heidenheimer and Michael, 2001: 159-172).
Where there is strong executive authority and elite inter-penetration 
with the presence of loyal inner circles, advisers and cabinet (sometimes 
reinforced by transfers of civil servants to political posts and the private 
sector), cohesion can be fostered, with a tendency toward protection from 
outside scrutiny and bureaucratic checks (France, Belgium, Italy, Ireland, 
Japan,  Britain,  Portugal). A  wide  dispersal  of  power,  however,  is  not 
necessarily  an  answer  to  these  problems.  Federalism  in  the  US,  for 
example, 'multiplies the point of access and influence and thus disperses 
opportunities  for  corruption'  (Williams,  1981).  In  Spain  too,  the 
decentralization of power that accompanied economic structural changes 
(in the relationship between the public and private sectors) multiplied 
decision-making centers and thus opportunities for corrupt practices.
The political cultural factors outlined above will also have a greater 
impact depending on the effectiveness of mechanisms of prevention and 
exposure. One should note in particular the difficulties in exercising, and 
therefore  the  declining  efficacy  of,  the  scrutiny  role  performed  by 
legislatures  (Italy,  Ireland,  Britain)  (Stapenhurst  and  Sahr,  1999:  86) 
Prevention and exposure may relate to the judiciary's effectiveness, its 
activism (which may be shaped by how far culture and society tolerate it) 
and its degree of politicization or autonomy (which has an impact on its 
investigative capacities) (Italy, Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain). They 
may also relate to the protection of whistleblowers (for which few countries 
have provision). Finally, prevention and detection may relate to the role 
played by less formal institutions such as the media and the degree to which 
media  personnel  engage  in  investigative  journalism  and  exposure 
(Belgium and France are goof examples of countries with traditionally 
weak media). Since the exposure of Watergate the US has been held up as 
an  example  of  an  idealistic  and  crusading  media,  but,  as  Williams 
(Williams, 1981: 72) points out, serous investigative journalism is very 
costly.  He  also  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  most  interesting  recent 
development  is  the  growth  of  unofficial  Internet  sites  dedicated  to 
corruption  exposure.  Moreover,  despite  the  prominence  of  corruption 
scandals in recent years, it has in the past often been difficult to generate a 
focus on public concern and give corruption prominence.
Nevertheless, in general, the attitudes of the media have certainly 
changed: there is no longer the respect of those in authority, and the media 
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corrupt practices even in countries (Portugal, France) where previously this 
hardly existed.
Party  System,  Party  Government,  Political  Parties  and 
Politicians
Where the party system facilitates the domination in government of 
a single party or parties (e.g. Italy, Japan), it can provide a fertile bed for 
corruption  because  there  would  appear  to  be  a  correlation  between 
corruption and longevity in power. Party dominance also has a bearing on 
the role of political parties in relation to the state and civil society (Naresh, 
2006; Adediji, 1991; Amundsen, 1999). The penetration of a clientelistic 
mode  of  managing  power  can  reduce  drastically  the  societal  and 
bureaucratic protections and controls against the growth of corruption 
(Italy, Japan, Belgium). These countries are more extreme example, but it is 
important to note that the decline of traditional bureaucratic controls and 
supervision was, from the 1980s onwards, a generalized phenomenon that 
accompanied the shift toward private-sector techniques of management or, 
to use fashionable expressions, privatization or 'neoliberalism' (Britain) 
(Mills, 1987).
Irrespective of the more indirect facilitators of corruption, it is 
political parties' need for funding in order to be electorally successful that 
constitutes one of the main direct causes of corruption. In situations where 
the cost of successful election campaigns has risen, where funding (and 
notably state funding) is inadequate, and where party finance laws are 
insufficiently robust, parties and politicians will be susceptible to entering 
into corrupt exchanges (Italy, Ireland, Japan, Belgium, France, Portugal, 
Spain, and even Germany where parties, compared with elsewhere, are 
generously  funded  by  the  state).  This  tendency  has  arguably  been 
reinforced  by  the  decline  in  the  intensity  of  ideological  conflict  that 
occurred in the 1990s. This, by narrowing the political spectrum, makes it 
more difficult for politicians to rely on ideological differences to mobilize 
the electorate (Shah, 2004).
This tendency is reinforced at the level of the single politician where the 
system of election may encourage individual campaigns and dependence 
on individually built-up resources (notably but not only in PR systems with 
preference votes). The role of politicians, moreover, is significant, because 
where, at the highest level, they fail to provide visible ethical leadership; 
this can have a filter down effect on the population leading to a fall over 
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Belgium, France, Portugal). The rising levels of corruption in Italy, for 
example, can be partly explained by the gradual replacement (in the context 
of continuity of a political class) of existing politicians and administrators 
by people with lower moral caliber.
Political Economy: The Public and Private Sectors
From  a  political  economy  perspective,  the  direct  cause  of 
corruption lies in the relationship established between entrepreneurs on the 
one hand, and politicians and bureaucrats on the other. It should be noted, 
however, that it is difficult to establish with any certainty the likely impact 
of the state of the economy. On the one hand, a long period of economic 
growth can provide opportunities for quick enrichment which are less than 
legal. On the other hand, a decline in economic growth can result in rising 
demands on the state to take corrective measures, and this can provide fresh 
opportunities  for  politicians  and  state  officials  to  indulge  in  corrupt 
practices (Hancock, 1989;  Hines, 1995; Jacoby and Eells, 1977)
Nevertheless,  the  willingness  of  entrepreneurs,  politicians  and 
bureaucrats to enter into such relationships will depend, most obviously, on 
the ethical climate on the country in question. But more profoundly, it will 
depend on the degree of legislative certainty, and on the degree to which 
public action is efficient and impartial – qualities that entrepreneurs need in 
order to compete and thrive. Where these conditions are not present, or 
where they are in decline, or where there is simply disorganization and 
mismanagement, a system of corrupt exchanges offers entrepreneurs the 
possibility of re-establishing those conditions that are critical to rational 
business  decision-making  (OECD,  1996;  Rose-Ackerman  and  Stone, 
1996).  Where  business  and  commercial  sectors  are  highly  or  over-
regulated, they are prone to corruption because companies seek political 
allies to help them circumvent regulations or win public contracts (e.g. 
Germany). This is not to suggest that public regulation is always and 
everywhere associated with corruption. Indeed, a growth in corruption can 
also be identified where there has been privatization and a drive toward 
deregulation of commercial activity. There is, of course, an international 
dimension here. International liberalization and the increasing openness of 
economies (resulting in greater import and export flows) have increased the 
propensities toward international corruption, although, as Andvig suggests, 
greater openness may, in the long-term, result in a reduction (Andvig and 
Kalle, 1990; Andvig, 1991).
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trends and the magnitude of problems deriving form these trends. As 
mentioned above, since the 1980s private-sector management techniques 
increasingly prevail in the public sector. This has caused turbulence in the 
existing ethical environment and confusion amongst public servants about 
the standards of conduct to which they should be adhering. This applies not 
only to advanced democracies (e.g. Britain, France), and countries which 
have undergone 'democratization' in the recent past (Spain, Greece), but 
also  those  countries  undergoing  'democratization'  (or  'democratic 
consolidation')  and  'transition.'  In  CEE,  the  transformation  is 
comprehensive and radical, the degree of confusion considerable, and the 
opportunities for corruption high (Karlins, 2005; Charlick, 1993; Damary, 
2000; Kaufman and Kaliberda, 1996; Rose-Ackerman, 1995).
The factors outlined above summarize the indirect and more direct 
causes  of  corruption  in  contemporary  politics. Their  significance  and 
impact will, of course, vary from one country to another and I would also 
emphasize that as long as it lies undetected, corruption is bound to increase 
simply  because  once  the  phenomenon  is  established  it  becomes  self-
generating. This throws a spotlight on the dynamics of corruption.
Dynamics of Corruption
The  reason  why  corruption,  once  established,  becomes  self-
generating, is because of the inverse relationship between the amount of 
corruption  that  exists  and  the  risk  of  indulging  in  it  oneself.  When 
corruption is a marginal phenomenon, there are few reliable partners, the 
risk of being caught is therefore higher, it is less easily defended or justified 
and  the  likelihood  of  severe  admonishment  or  punishment  greater. 
However, once corruption begins to spread, the potential partners are 
manifold, the risk of being caught diminished, the likelihood of being able 
to defend one's actions and escape conviction is greater, as a decline in 
ethical standards sets in across society and the political system. As it was 
often observed in Italy, as entrepreneurs and politicians became socialized 
in the practices of corruption, the networks grew and gained in solidity. 
Corruption  feeds  on  itself  and  can  be  defended  on  the  grounds  that 
'everybody does it' (Italy, Ireland, Japan, Britain). In this way, corruption 
can become systemic, or a culture of corruption ingrained (Japan, Italy, 
CEE)  because  it  is  not  rational  for  an  individual  (especially  an 
entrepreneur) to stay outside of the 'circle of corruption' (Andreski, 1978; 
Jagannathan, 1986). At the heart of the process is the so-called 'business 
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property; who therefore distributes rewards on the basis of loyalty; who 
develops electoral and party followings often using corrupt methods; and 
who may also use corrupt methods to ensure that the corrupted partner 
respects the exchange and does not squeal. Here the role of organized crime 
(and thus, if nothing else, the threat of violence) is sometimes important to 
ensuring that officials act corruptly and that the corruption process runs 
smoothly, as shown in Nelken's (Nelken, 1997) account of the misuse of EU 
structural  funds.  In  general,  the  idea  is  to  create  an  image  of  being 
'powerful' (Italy).
A key aspect of the dynamic of corruption, then, is not just the 
corrupt  exchange  itself  but  the  development  by  the  participants  (and 
notably politicians) of various protection mechanisms which can prevent 
discovery or hinder or sabotage investigations (Italy, Japan, Belgium, EU). 
These may include efforts to exploit inadequate legislation based on trust, 
or the insistence that any revelations are isolated examples and that core 
moral values remain intact (Britain before the 1980s and 1990s). Using 
whatever method, however, the general objective is the same: to attempt to 
divert  responsibility to  avoid  prosecution.  For  example, in  France,  in 
Evans' words (Evans, 1996), 'the salient feature is a continuous passing of 
the buck, a refusal by the notables, whether national or local, to accept 
responsibility.'
Anti-Corruption Laws and Campaign, Remedies and Solutions
Anti-corruption campaigns on the part of magistrates and others 
have increased in the past two decades, and as a consequence revelations 
about corruption have become more widespread. This has not just been at 
national  level  (e.g.  Italy,  Ireland,  Japan,  CEE,  Spain),  but  at  the 
supranational and international levels (e.g. the EU's launch of explicit anti-
corruption strategies in post-communist countries). In the US it happened 
somewhat earlier, triggered by Watergate, something which marked the 
beginning of an explicit FBI strategy to uncover corruption of politicians at 
both the federal and state levels, and legislative attempts to prevent and 
control corruption (Langan and Cooksey, 1995).
The reasons for this increase in activity are not easy to identify. Part 
of the explanation, of course, is that there has been an increase in corruption 
and varieties of corruption, as I argue in this paper. There has also been a 
degree of international diffusion, with institutional and political learning by 
some countries as a result of intense media coverage of corruption in those 
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class. The exposure of corruption in Italy has had a noticeable effect, 
especially in northern Europe, because it was first uncovered in the 'moral 
capital,' Milan, which had always had the image of being a “northern 
European city” in contrast with Rome. This rang alarms bells in other 
European cities. However, it is also true that the rapid spread of corruption 
and organized crime in the newly 'democratizing' countries of CEE has also 
generated considerable concern.
Other factors causing the increase in anti-corruption activity relate 
to the increase in the autonomy, capacity and willingness of magistrates to 
investigate corruption (e.g. Italy and France). This is not to suggest that 
prior to the recent period there was no judicial anti-corruption activity. 
However, it would appear that in many countries this activity has been more 
successful than in the past in exposing corruption and that the explanation 
for this, in turn, lies in the reduce ability of the corrupt (politicians and 
others) to withstand or undermine judicial investigations (e.g. Italy and 
France) (Pope, 1995).
It is undoubtedly because of this that in a number of countries 
politicians have launched, against the judicial branch, accusations of a 
witch-hunt, while trying to save themselves through general amnesties and 
other abuses of power. The case of Silvio Berlusconi, with a number of 
charges (including corruption and illegal financing of political parties) 
outstanding against him, is exemplary of this. Having been elected Prime 
Minister in the 2001 elections, he than managed to use his position to secure 
legislation  considerably  tightening  the  conditions  under  which  certain 
kinds of evidence are admissible in court. The expected result of this was 
that  the  increased  amount  of  time  that  the  cases  against  him  and  his 
associates required was such that the charges were in the end dropped under 
the statute of limitations (Krastev, 2004; Shah, 2004).
Meanwhile, anti-corruption efforts can be undermined because of a 
lack of conviction behind clean-up campaigns, and their consequent failure 
to make an impact. In Britain, for example, complacency led to the view 
that the scale of the problem had been exaggerated by public perception. 
The focus, therefore, was on improving standards of behavior rather than on 
tighter regulation, and this was accompanied by poor investigation of 
alleged  cases  of  corruption  and  a  constant  failure  to  implement  anti-
corruption recommendations or to monitor the implementation of certain 
measures once approved (Naresh, 2006: 840). In several countries there 
have been many acquittals and the survival or return of some of the old 
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Anti-corruption efforts need not necessarily take the form of a 
campaign by magistrates and others to eliminate existing corruption. They 
can also take the form of measures aimed at preventing its appearance in the 
future. The most important examples include:
- Legislation (or codes of conduct) on ethics in public office and 
incompatibility  of  office  (Ireland,  Britain,  the  Netherlands,  Belgium, 
France, Sweden, US, Portugal, CEE, Spain, Greece);
- ‘vulnerability’ investigations (Netherlands);
- Amendment of laws providing immunity from investigation by 
magistrates for members of parliament (Italy, Belgium);
- Amendment of laws of party financing, contributions to parties, 
campaign  funding  (Italy,  Japan,  Germany,  Britain,  the  Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, US, Sweden, Greece);
- Electoral reform (Italy, Japan);
- Privatization of enterprises, deregulation, amendment of laws on 
public procurement (Italy, Japan, Greece);
-  Depoliticization  of  the  civil  service  and  public  enterprises 
(Belgium);
-  Depoliticization  of  the  judiciary  and  an  increase  in  judicial 
independence (Belgium, Portugal);
- Establishment of local chapters of TI in order to devise anti-
corruption strategies (CEE);
Tighter regulation of firms in their business dealings with foreign 
companies and states (US) (Huther and Shah, 1998; Keefer and Knack, 
1996).
Impact of Corruption and Exposure of Corruption
The impact of corruption, and the impact of the exposure of specific 
instances of corruption, may, or may not, coincide. Therefore, if only from 
an analytical perspective, it is useful to separate the two sets of impact.
Impact of Corruption
There are several effects deriving from the presence of corruption in 
a country's political system (Klitgaard, 1988):
- A financial drain on the state, contributing in some countries to a 
rise in public debt (Italy, Belgium) and/or a growth tax burden (Italy, 
Ireland) (Bayley, 1966);
- Capital flight and lower levels of domestic and foreign investment, 
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(Ireland, CEE). In the countries of CEE a decline in foreign investment can 
make it more difficult to carry through social and economic reform, thus 
creating a vicious circle (Mauro, 1997, 1998);
- An undermining of the safeguard of collective responsibility, a 
consequence of the failure of cabinet members to act over doubts about the 
probity of senior colleagues (Italy, Ireland) (Gould and Amaro, 1983);
- A decline in trust, either in the political system as a whole, or in 
specific institutions, and notably parties and parliament (and, of course, the 
politicians staffing them). This can lead to growing voter apathy (registered 
in  higher  abstention  rates)  (Italy,  Ireland,  Japan,  Belgium,  Germany, 
France, US, Sweden, CEE). It can also produce support for parties of the 
extreme  right  (Italy,  Belgium,  France),  even  if  these  parties  are  not 
necessarily free from corrupt practices themselves once in office (France) 
(Kang, 2002; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006)
Impact of Exposure to Corruption
The impact of exposure of corruption will depend on a series of 
factors that emanate from the particular country's mores and traditions as 
well  as  the  prominence  of  other  important  issues  at  the  time.  The 
seriousness  of  the  offence  will  be  only  one  of  these  factors  and  not 
necessarily the main determinant. The impact can be registered at different 
levels of society and the system:
Political parties. First, there can be a financial impact, if the parties 
have become increasingly dependent upon corruption as a source of funds 
(Italy, Germany – where the parties were ordered to repay corrupt receipts). 
Second,  there  can  be  an  organizational  impact,  where  exposure  can 
undermine  the  membership  base  and  leave  parties  close  to  collapse, 
especially  where  they  have  increasingly  attracted  members  for 
instrumental reasons (or illicit gains) rather than because of ideological or 
policy commitment (Italy) (Bac, 1996).
Party system. Where the effects on individual political parties are 
cumulative,  widespread  and  involve  the  principal  parties  in  the  party 
system, this can cause changes in the nature of competition between parties 
(Italy, Germany) and even a transformation of the party system (Italy) 
(Brooks, 1978).
Electorate. At one extreme, the exposure of corruption can cause 
outrage  amongst  the  electorate,  voting  those  politicians  and  parties 
responsible  out  of  office  in  a  form  of  popular  revolt  against  the 
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insignificant with little effect on voting behavior. In between the extremes, 
corruption can be an issue in elections (e.g. Belgium, Spain) whose overall 
impact, however, is difficult to evaluate (World Bank, 1997; Tanzi, 1998; 
Schaffer, 1986).
Political system. Exposure of corruption can lead to high levels of 
political instability as prime ministers, governments and personnel are 
brought down (Italy, Japan) (Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
Nation-state.  The  exposure  of  corruption  can  increase  existing 
territorial divisions. For example, in Italy it increased the hostility of the 
north of the country toward the south by helping to fuel support for an 
autonomist Northern League that saw in Tangentopoli further evidence of 
the way in which northern prosperity was being undermined by a Rome-
based 'partitocracy'. In Germany, it caused disillusionment of the east 
towards western Germany, since corruption was uncovered almost entirely 
in the west (Doig and McIvor, 2003).
Political culture. The impact in terms of declining levels of public 
trust, disaffection with politics and voter apathy has been noted in the 
section on the impact of corruption. What is more questionable is the extent 
to which the exposure of corruption has caused a genuine debate on the 
cultural roots which facilitate the emergence of corruption (examples of 
this absence are Italy and Ireland) (Heidenheimer and Johnston, 2001).
Conclusion
There seems to be little doubt that there has been a rise in corruption 
in recent decades and, in the late 1990s and the beginning of the 21st 
century, a rise in the exposure of corruption. There have been an increasing 
number of anti-corruption actions and measures, and in some countries 
(e.g. Italy, Japan, Belgium) this has led to a number of high profile arrests 
and convictions.
Yet,  the  extent  to  which  this  anti-corruption  drive  has  been 
successful  remains  very  much  an  open  question.  Italy,  for  example, 
witnessed the removal of a large part of the political class, yet many elites 
have survived or returned and many of the problems that bedeviled the 
political system remain. In France, there is little visible impact at the elite 
level of the corruption scandals of the 1980s and 1990s, beyond failed 
prosecutions, amnesties and political comebacks. In Portugal, the special 
anti-corruption agency established as early as 1979 was wound up in 1992 
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corruption which included links to politicians, and there is a continuing 
impression amongst the population that both politicians and magistrates are 
corrupt. In Greece only a very small number of those who have been taken 
to court have ended up being punished.
This is not to suggest that anti-corruption campaigns are completely 
ineffective.  They  can  serve  an  important  purpose  in  raising  public 
awareness  and  creating  a  climate  in  which  anti-corruption  laws  and 
solutions can be carries through. However, it is also evident that there are 
limits to the long-term impact of exposure of corruption, after which 
populations can become cynical, and support for these campaigns and 
solutions  can  wane  (Italy,  Japan,  CEE). Although  corruption  may  be 
considered  serious,  other  (socio-economic)  objectives  may  be  more 
important to publics than governments fighting corruption, and the danger 
is that with the loss of salience of the issue it results in a downgrading of the 
fight against it. Evidently, one can dwell on the ineffectiveness of some 
anti-corruption measures and the need for stronger laws to make it easier to 
prosecute  corrupt  politicians  and  officials.  Nevertheless,  because 
corruption is so difficult to detect (due to its clandestine nature) and then to 
prove, legal sanctions are unlikely ever to be a significant deterrent. For that 
reason, in the late 1980s the US Senate Ethics Committee argued that what 
was important was the appearance of impropriety and that the benchmark 
was less what was legally possible than what a reasonable, non-partisan, 
fully-informed person would do. This suggests a possible response to the 
fundamental dilemma pointed out by Britain's National Institute of Law 
Enforcement and Criminal Justice (referred to by Doig, 2003): that while 
there are three controllable elements to corruption (opportunity, incentive 
and  risk),  there  always  remains  one  uncontrollable  element,  namely, 
personal honesty.
This  is  not  to  suggest  that  there  is  no  room  for  legislative 
improvement.  In  the  Netherlands,  for  example,  the  phrasing  of  anti-
corruption articles in the penal code has been tightened by moving away 
from a dogmatic requirement to prove that a public official knew that a gift 
received was a relation to a favor bestowed. To secure a conviction now it is 
sufficient to show that the civil servant should have known this. In Belgium 
too (where the penal code makes a distinction between passive and active 
corruption,  and  where  it  is  difficult  to  prove  that  corruption  actually 
occurred) revision of the code has made corruption allegations easier to 
prove.
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matter of honesty and what a 'reasonable' person would be expected to do, 
but of culture, because some societies may have distinctive cultural traits 
that make certain practices more acceptable than they would be in other 
societies. In Japan, for example, many voters (especially conservative 
voters in rural and small-town areas) expect the delivery of gifts from their 
elected members. Meanwhile, local politicians or power brokers expect 
even  larger  gifts  from  those  above  for  delivering  their  own  support, 
something that shows how popular and elite attitudes can reinforce each 
other.  In  Portugal,  former  ministers  accused  of  corruption  reacted 
indignantly to the charges, seemingly unaware that what they had done was 
wrong because of their immersion in a patrimonial culture of amiguismo. 
This issue may be even more problematic in relation to the EU because, as 
Nelken notes (Nelken, 1997), the tendency towards corrupt practices is 
influenced by the lack of real association or belief in a supranational state: 
the extortion, therefore, is from something which the perpetrators do not see 
as their own. What is noticeable is that, despite the spread of corruption and 
its exposure, there has been an absence of any serious reflection or debate in 
the various countries on the cultural traits that facilitate the emergence of 
corruption and how they might be tackled.
There would appear to be two interrelated levels that need to be 
tackled: the individual and the system (or broader society). It is possible to 
portray ideas for both these levels. With respect to the individual, for 
example, the Nolan Committee in Britain called for the respect of seven 
principles of public life: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, 
openness, honesty and leadership. These principles should, the committee 
argued, be underpinned by codes of conduct, internal systems and guidance 
and education in specific areas. With respect to the system, Transparency 
International has defined the fundamental parts of a 'National Integrity 
System' (as outlined in Transparency International reports, 1998, 1999, 
2000,  2001). These  include:  political  democracy;  partnership  between 
government and organizations; modern administration with a tradition of 
reform; administrative law aimed at the probity and accountability of 
decision-makers;  channels  for  reporting  corruption,  and  monitoring 
procedures; an independent judiciary; an open, competitive and transparent 
system of public procurement; private sector self-regulation with rules and 
legal deterrence against corruption; an alert and free media; independent 
anti-corruption agencies, and cooperation with other countries to combat 
international corruption.
94
IBSU Scientific Journal      2 (1), 2008These are obvious ideals. While they provide countries with a 
benchmark by which to evaluate their current situation relative to the state 
of other nations, they provide only general guidelines as to how a state can 
regulate institutions, personnel and activities in such a way as to minimize 
corruption. Yet, they do underline certain important points. 
First,  addressing  individual  behavior  and  responsibility  is 
paramount, difficult as this may be. Second, laws and regulations should 
not be merely restrictive, but should attempt to reinforce the importance of 
moral and ethical behavior. Doig, using the research of authors such as 
Anechiarico and Jacobs (Anechiarico and James, 1996), emphasizes the 
limitations of an exclusive reliance on anti-corruption laws and regulations, 
in view of the assumption on which they are formulated – that public 
officials are not to be trusted – and the effect this is likely to have on the 
behavior of politicians and the attitudes of the public. Third, the broader 
emphasis of any anti-corruption campaign should be on trying to promote 
and improve a common ethical culture, something that requires education 
and cultural change. 
This  does  not  mean  hoping  to  return  to  a  golden  age  when 
corruption  did  not  exist.  Proceeding  on  that  false  assumption  (as  has 
happened in the British case) makes achievement of the objective more 
difficult, for if corruption can be considered a profession, then it probably 
has greater claim than does spying to be the second oldest. In that case, the 
task of overcoming it is a long-term one based on education, integrity 
policies and cultural change, and thus far this approach is most noticeable in 
countries  with  good  corruption  records,  such  as  Sweden  and  the 
Netherlands. This suggests that processes such as European integration 
have an important role to play in gradually modernizing some states and 
cultures and undermining their patrimonial and clientistic practices, this, 
however, will require the institutions of the EU themselves to develop a 
better image in relation to corruption.
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